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Turkey-Iran Relations after the
Islamic Revolution of 1979
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran constituted a turning point in Turkish-Iranian
relations.  Immediately  after  the  revolution,  new  Iranian  leaders  declared  Iran’s
withdrawal from CENTO. Thus, the revolution did not only come up with dissolution of
that alliance, but also positioned Turkey and Iran against each other. First of all,  in
terms  of  its  political  regime,  its  commitment  to  secularism  and  foreign  policy
orientation,  Turkey  represented  what  the  revolutionaries  opposed  in  Iran,  where
‘fundamentalist Islamists’ led by a group of clerics under the leadership of Ayatollah
Khomeini seized power. Soon after, they proclaimed the Islamic Republic and engaged
in reversing the Pahlavi ‘reforms’ towards secularism and Westernisation. Hence, while
the two countries were proceeding towards different, or contradictory directions an
important pillar of the previous Turkish-Iranian proximity was destroyed. Secondly,
Turkey  was  still  a  close  ally  of  the  United  States  in  contrast  to  the  rise  of  anti-
Americanism in revolutionary Iran. Whilst the US-Iran relations were heading towards
direct confrontation between Tehran and Washington, particularly after the hostage
crisis, the alliance between Washington and Ankara was strengthened after the military
coup d’état of 1980 in Turkey. The close relations between the United States and Turkey
were perceived as a potential threat by the revolutionary Iran. Moreover, Iran viewed
the coup as an attempt against the Islamic Revolution. Thirdly, the threat of the spread
of revolution was alarming for Turkey. Revolutionary Iran was committed to export its
revolution  to  neighbouring  countries  for  strategic  and  idealist  reasons.  Ayatollah
Khomeini  called  on  neighbouring  nations  to  revolt  against  their  despotic  regimes
supported  by  the  United  States  and establish  Islamic  governments.  Khomeini’s  call
alarmed rulers  of  the adjacent countries  including the Turkish elite.  Moreover,  the
early  1980s  witnessed the rise  of  militant  Islamists  in  Turkey,  some of  whom were
highly  sympathetic  to  the  Islamic  revolution  in  Iran.  For  this  reason,  the  Turkish
authorities  watched  the  activities  of  Islamist  groups  and  their  relations  with  Iran,
apprehensively.  Finally,  many  people  that  opposed  the  revolution  in  Iran  fled  the
country,  some  of  whom  found  shelter  in  Turkey.  The  Islamic  regime  in  Iran  was
displeased with the ‘counter-revolutionaries’ that found refuge at the next door.
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On the other hand, conventional Turkish concerns with regard to the prospective fall of
Iran  to  communism  or  to  the  Soviet  sphere  of  influence,  constrained  Turkey’s
responses to the revolution.15 Turkey prioritised maintaining stability with Iran and its
territorial integrity. Additionally, Turkey was desperately in need of oil at affordable
prices, and hence, eager to develop economic ties with its neighbour. Consequently, the
Turkish  government  immediately  recognised  the  new  regime  and  Turkish  foreign
minister of the time, Gündüz Ökçün visited Tehran in June 1979.16 
The economic motivation of both Turkey and Iran for improving their relations were
enhanced  throughout  the  1980s.  Turkey  adopted  an  export-oriented  development
strategy and searched for valuable markets, whereas Iran suffered from the flight of a
considerable amount of international capital and from Western economic sanctions.
Moreover, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war compelled both countries to improve their
trade ties with Turkey in order to ensure deliverance of basic goods. The then Turkish
deputy prime minister Turgut Özal, accompanied by a crowd of businessmen visited
Tehran in March 1982. They concluded a barter trade agreement that envisaged Iranian
oil  supply in return for wheat,  dairy products,  and poultry.  Subsequently,  the then
prime minister Bülent Ulusu paid an official visit to Iran in August 1982, when the two
countries agreed to establish joint economic commission in order to promote bilateral
trade relations and address potential problems. Later on, the two countries revived the
dormant RCD, and turned it  into Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) in 1985.
Thus, the annual trade volume between the two countries amounted to two billion US
dollars in the mid-1980s.17 Iran then became the second largest oil supplier for Turkish
market (after Iraq).
In the 1980s the Kurdish question posed a new challenge for Turkish-Iranian relations.
Initially, Turkey watched apprehensively at the growing military partnership between
the Iraqi Kurdish parties and Iran, against Iraq. Moreover, instability in the north of
Iraq  as  part  of  Kurdish  fight  against  Baghdad  helped  the  PKK  Kurdish  separatist
movement, to settle there and wage armed attacks inside Turkey. The Kurdish parties
that were supported by Iran, particularly the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) had
close relations with the PKK, and Iran had reportedly allowed the activities of the PKK
inside Iranian territories. In order to alleviate the security concerns of both parties,
Ankara and Tehran signed a security protocol in 1984. Accordingly, the parties assured
each  other  they  would  prevent  the  activities  of  any  group  or  movement  that
threatened security of the other.18
The  adverse  effects  of  the  ideological  discrepancy  between  the  Islamic  Republican
regime in Iran and the western-oriented, secular Turkish republic haunted the bilateral
relations of the two countries towards the late 1980s.19 In particular, the censures of
Iranian leaders with respect to the prevalence of secularism in Turkey and its Western-
orientation, in addition to its alliance with the United States were widely circulated in
the Turkish media. In return, Turkish officials heavily reprimanded the Iranian regime
and its own orientation, which led to a verbal quarrel through the media between the
two countries. Additionally, the statements of Iranian officials condemning a resolution
of the constitutional court that confirmed ban on hijab in Turkish universities, were
viewed by Turkish elite as the Iranian interference in domestic affairs. Additionally,
Iran was accused of supporting some Islamist movements in Turkey. Eventually, the
two countries mutually withdrew their ambassadors in 1989.
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The  tension  between  Turkey  and  Iran noticeably  escalated  in  the  1990s.  Firstly,
ideological confrontation prevailed over bilateral relations.20 In this period, ideological
tension  between  Ankara  and  Tehran  went  beyond  mutual  criticisms  against  each
other’s political regime through the media. There was a revival of Islamic activism in
the early 1990s as proved both by the rise of principal political Islamist party, Refah
Partisi, and the growing number of extremist religious groups. Moreover, some of these
extremist groups, like Hizbullah, armed themselves and started to perpetrate terrorist
attacks. It may be argued that Iranian intelligence used some Turkish Islamists in order
to  gather  information  on  Iranian  dissidents  in  Turkey  and  stage  some  operations
against  them,  and  to  attack  some  foreign  diplomats  in  Ankara.21 After  a  series  of
assassinations  against  well-known  secular  Turkish  intellectuals,  including  Bahriye
Üçok, Çetin Emeç, Turan Dursun and Uğur Mumcu, the Turkish security elite hinted at
Iranian involvement in these attacks. Confessions of the perpetrators of some terror
attacks  arguably  revealed  political  and  logistic  connections  between  Iran  and  the
militants.  Henceforth,  Iran  was  continuously  accused  of  supporting  radical  Islamist
organisations and terrorist groups in order to destabilise and weaken the republican
regime, which would eventually be replaced by an Islamist one.22
Secondly,  Turkish  security  concerns  that  deepened  in  this  period  led  to  the
securitisation  of  Turkish  politics  and  foreign  policy.  In  addition  to  the  rise  of  the
perceived threat from increasing Islamist activism, the threat of ‘Kurdish separatism’
and  ‘terrorism’  was  considered  by  the  Turkish  elite  as  major  threats  to  national
security. Increasing armed activities of the PKK, which exploited political instability in
the north of Iraq after the Gulf War of 1991 became a major security concern. As a
result, Turkish armed forces pursued comprehensive operations against the PKK both
inside the country and in the north of Iraq. The Turkish government then frequently
charged Iran, and Syria, of supporting the PKK activities.23 
Against this background, the opposing strategic alignments of the two countries across
the region amplified the security concerns of the two parties. Besides its close relations
with  the  United  States,  Turkey  intensified  its  relations  with  Israel  into  a  strategic
partnership  in  the  mid-1990s,  which  irked  the  Iranian  leaders  who  viewed  that
development  as  a  hostile  action  against  the  revolutionary  regime.24 In  return,  Iran
consolidated its relations with Syria and Russia, which equally disturbed the Turkish
elite.  In  addition,  Iran and Turkey crafted  alternative  ‘alliances’  with  rival  Kurdish
parties in the north of Iraq in order to control the region and contain their respective
Kurdish ‘opposition’ activities there. While Turkey developed good relations with the
KDP  (Kurdistan  Democratic  Party)  led  by  Masoud  Barzani,  Iran  maintained  a  close
affinity with the PUK led by Jalal Talabani. 
Finally, after the dissolution of the USSR, Ankara and Tehran engaged in competition
for influence over the newly independent states in the Caucasus and Central Asia. This
competition  had  both  ideological  and  economic  aspects.  The  Turkish  government
presented its  political  regime, as a secular,  Western-oriented regime based on free-
market economy, as a model to be followed by the newly independent states of the
region. At that time, most of the Western countries led by the United States promoted
these new republics to adopt the Turkish model, against the ‘fundamentalist’ model of
Iran. For its part, the Iranian government was concerned with the rise of ‘Pan-Turkism’
in the region that was supported by the West, which would threaten vital interests of
Iran, particularly in the case of Azerbaijan which was very sensitive for Iranian security
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considerations. Hence, both countries rushed to improve their political, cultural and
economic relations with these republics. Another aspect of the geopolitical competition
over  the  region  revolved  around  the  construction of  oil  and  gas  pipelines  for  the
energy resources of the Caspian basin. Eventually a deal for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil
pipeline  that  sidelined  Iran  was  signed  in  1994.  However,  Iran  prevented  the
construction of any gas pipeline that would bypass Iran by shipping Turkmenistan’s
natural gas to Turkey and the rest of Europe through the Caspian basin, exploiting its
contested status.  By the late 1990s the newly independent states consolidated their
independence  and  counterbalanced  their  behaviour  towards  Iran  and  Turkey.  In
addition to the lack of adequate economic capacity in Ankara and Tehran to maintain
their competition over Central Asia, the revival of Russian influence in the region eased
Iranian-Turkish contention.25
The growing tension between Ankara and Tehran reached its height and turned into a
diplomatic crisis  in the second half  of  the 1990s.  Besides Mohammad Reza Bagheri,
Iranian  ambassador  to  Ankara,  a  number  of  Iranian  diplomats  in  Turkey  were
compelled to leave the country in February 1997, allegedly for interfering in domestic
politics.  Iran  retaliated  by  dismissing  the  Turkish  ambassador  to  Tehran,  Osman
Korutürk,  alongside  some  other  diplomats.  Ambassadors  of  the  respective  states
returned  in  March  1998.  Then,  mutual  accusations  of  involvement  in  destructive
activities against each other, and mutual denouncements of their respective political
regimes between the two capitals resurfaced in the media headlines. Eventually Iran
blamed  Turkey  for  violating  its  airspace  and  bombing  territories  inside  Iran  while
taking military action against the PKK, and captured two Turkish soldiers in August
1999  for  illegally  crossing  the  border.  Although  the  controversy  over  the  Turkish
bombardment  of  Iranian  soil  and  the  captured  soldiers  was  soon  settled,  tension
remained  high  between  the  two  countries.  Consequently,  newly  elected  Turkish
President A.  Necdet Sezer abstained from participation to the ECO Summit meeting
held in Tehran in June 2000.26 
As an extension of the deterioration in Turkish-Iranian relations through the 1990s,
economic transactions between the countries considerably decreased. Combined with
the  economic  crisis  experienced  in  the  respective  countries  and  the  decline  in  oil
prices, total trade volume decreased to below one billion US dollars per year from the
peak of  two billion in  the  1980s.  Another  factor  that  contributed to  the  decline  in
bilateral  economic relations was the cancellation of  the barter trade agreements in
1985 by Iran, which blamed Turkish traders for overcharging third party products to
their Iranian counterparts. Hence, Turkish exports to Iran remained at around four
hundred to five hundred million dollars between 1986 and 1992. The value of Turkish
exports to Iran further fell to below two hundred million in 1998 and 1999, while the
total  volume of  trade between the two countries was around six hundred and fifty
million in 1998.27 
Notwithstanding  the  rising  tension  between  Ankara  and  Tehran  cooperation  in
diplomatic, security, and economic aspects was maintained. Despite the rising tension
between  the  two  capitals,  they  preserved  diplomatic  relations.  The  two  countries
agreed  to  expand  the  ECO  to  include  Afghanistan,  Azerbaijan,  and  the  newly
independent  Central  Asian  states  in  1992.  Additionally,  Turkey  headed  a  new
international  organisation among the leading countries  of  the Islamic world,  called
Developing-8  (D-8),  which  included  Iran.  Although  the  effectiveness  of  the  two
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organisations is questionable, they facilitated frequent meetings between the member
countries and contributed to the improvement of relations among them. 
Security cooperation between Iran and Turkey essentially revolved around two issues.
The first was border security. As neighbouring countries, they were preoccupied with
joint efforts to provide safety and stability around the border and the struggle against
smuggling and narcotics. Cooperation between the two countries on border security
issues  was  maintained within the  framework of  the  border  security  protocol  dated
1937. In this respect they maintained ties between both high-level security officials, to
the level of local security officials.28 The second issue of security cooperation between
Ankara and Tehran focused on containing the threat of ‘Kurdish separatism’ that was
perceived  in  the  respective  countries,  and  was  heightened  by  the  PKK  activism.
Additionally, the activities of Iranian opposition groups in Turkey and some Islamist
groups affiliated to Iran emerged as security issues between the two countries. When
Turkish Interior Minister, Ismet Sezgin, visited Tehran in September 1992, Turkey and
Iran concluded a security protocol.  Accordingly,  they instituted the Turkish-Iranian
High Commission for Security at the level of the undersecretaries of interior ministers,
the joint security committee, and the security subcommittees.29 The ensuing security
protocols envisaged the prevention of activities of terrorist groups in the respective
countries, and their exploitation of the joint border. Another part of Turkish-Iranian
security relations was directed to impede the emergence of an independent Kurdish
state in the north of Iraq. The shared concerns of Iran, Syria and Turkey in that regard
led to a series of tripartite meetings in the early 1990s. The identical stance of Iran and
Turkey  with  regard  to  the  preservation  of  the  territorial integrity  of  Iraq  and the
prevention of an independent Kurdish State has been maintained. 
As to economic relations, the Joint Economic Commission that was established in 1982
continued to meet regularly in Tehran and Ankara respectively, and addressed major
economic, trade and transportation issues. The then prime minister Yıldırım Akbulut,
visited  Tehran  in  March  1990,  where  they  discussed  the  feasibility  of  transferring
Iranian gas to Europe through Turkey. Subsequently, the two states started to negotiate
on agreements for the encouragement of mutual investments and the prevention of
double taxation.30 In this regard, the then prime minister Necmettin Erbakan paid his
first official visit to Tehran in August 1996. On that occasion, Turkey and Iran signed
the twenty-five-year natural gas agreement. It was projected that Iran would supply
Turkey with ten billion cubic meters of natural gas annually. It was a surprise for the
United States, which tried to isolate Iran and threatened any third party for investing
in the Iranian energy sector. Erbakan was blamed by some pundits for this agreement
as an extension of his Islamist foreign policy. However, natural gas trade had been on
the agenda of the two countries for over a decade and the Turkish government deemed
the agreement  to  be  an instrument  to  meet  growing domestic  energy demand and
decrease its dependency on Russia. After almost a two-year delay, the pipeline to ship
Iranian gas to Turkish markets was completed in December 2001. The commencement
of the flow of gas coincided with the ease of tensions between the two countries, and
combined, paved the way for growing economic relations between Iran and Turkey.
The Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK) and the Iranian Chamber for
Commerce, Industries and Mines and Agriculture (ICCIMA) agreed to the establishment
of the Turkish-Iranian Business Council in November 2001.31
President Sezer’s visit to Iran in June 2002 turned into a milestone in contemporary
Turkish-Iranian relations. On the sidelines of the visit, the first meeting of the Turkish-
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Iranian  Business  Forum was  held  with  the  participation  of  the  two heads  of  state.
President  Sezer  inaugurated  the  chair  of  Turkish  language  in  Allameh  Tabatabai
University,  and visited  Tabriz  as  part  of  his  program.  Sezer’s  visit  was  meaningful
because  he  had rejected attending the  ECO Summit  held  in  Tehran for  the  alleged
Iranian  support  for  terrorism.  Thus,  this  visit  became  the  symbol  of  a  relatively
amicable trend that Turkey-Iran relations entered into just  before the JDP came to
power in Ankara. 
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